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DOCUMENT DESTRUCTION AFTER ARTHUR
ANDERSEN: IS IT STILL HOUSEKEEPING OR IS IT A
CRIME?
Steven Lubet*
The indictment and subsequent conviction of Arthur
Andersen & Co.' has recently focused much attention on the
previously little-known subject of document retention. The
government charged that Andersen's auditors willfully
obstructed justice when they destroyed thousands of Enron work
papers as an SEC investigation loomed, but had not yet
commenced.2 In defense, the accounting firm's representatives
claimed that it was merely "good housekeeping" to inform
employees of the need to eliminate reams of unnecessary paper.'Because the jury evidently based its ultimate decision on an
* Professor of Law and Director, Program on Advocacy and Professionalism, Northwestern
University; B.A. Northwestern University, J.D. University of California, Berkeley.
1. United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Crim. Action No. H-02-0121 (S.D. Tex.
June 15, 2002).
2. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged
With Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. Times AI (Mar. 15, 2002).
3. Kristen Hays, Disposal Good Housekeeping: Andersen Official, Toronto Star C6
(May 28, 2002); Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Witnesses Defend Intent of Shredding, N.Y.
Times CI (June 1, 2002).
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altered memorandum rather than on the wholesale shredding,4
important questions about the legality of Andersen's policy were
not fully resolved. The resulting uncertainty seems likely to
yield confusion, as this short essay will demonstrate.
It is surely impossible for a large firm, or even an
individual, to retain every piece of paper generated in a
professional practice. But when must documents be saved and
stored, and when may they be destroyed? And most importantly,
what constitutes guilty knowledge when documents are in fact
being discarded? Every company in the United States is
probably reviewing its own policies, at one level or another, in
view of Andersen partner David Duncan's statement that he did
not initially believe he had done anything wrong, but after much
"soul searching" came to conclude that he had "committed a
crime." 5 The courts, however, have provided little guidance on
this issue, which will likely remain unaddressed when the Fifth
7Circuit reviews the Arthur Andersen case.
4. Jonathan D. Glater, Jurors Say File Shredding Didn't Factor Into Verdict, N.Y.
Times § 1, at 21 (June 16, 2002).
5. E.A. Torriero, Duncan: Believed Order To Be Legal, Chicago Trib. Bus. I (May
16, 2002); see also Carrie Johnson, "Soul-Searching" to Guilty Plea; Andersen Auditor
Says He Didn't Think He Broke Law at First, Washington Post El (May 16, 2002).
6. The appellate cases on spoliation, both state and federal, nearly all address the duty
to preserve evidence during active or clearly anticipated litigation. See e.g. Nation-Wide
Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distributors, Inc., 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982) (indicating that
litigation was pending); Caparotta v. Entergy Corp., 168 F.3d 754 (5th Cir. 1999) (same);
Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985) (same); Sargent v. Armontrout,
841 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 180 F.3d 294 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (indicating that litigation was anticipated, but not yet pending, when the
evidence was destroyed); Wuest v. McKennan Hosp., 619 N.W.2d 682 (S.D. 2000) (same,
and indicating that the documents were destroyed in the ordinary course of defendant
hospital's business); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 432 Utah
Adv. Rep. 44 (indicating that litigation was pending, and noting that insurer's practice of
routinely destroying documents made work of policyholders' attorney more difficult, and
treating it as a reasonable factor to consider in awarding attorney fees), cert. granted, 122
S. Ct. 2326 (June 3, 2002); Torgerson v. JournalSentinel Inc., 563 N.W.2d 472 (Wis.
1997) (indicating that litigation was anticipated, but not yet pending, when the evidence
was destroyed).
7. In response to special interrogatories, the jury indicated that its verdict was based
primarily on an altered memorandum circulated by Andersen attorney Nancy Temple,
rather than on the destruction of documents. Andersen's attorneys consequently premised
their post-trial motions on the claim that Temple's actions were not unlawful, rather than
on the legality or illegality of the document shredding. Lucas Wall, Judge Upholds
Andersen Guilty Verdict, Houston Chron. Bus. 3 (Sept. 13, 2002).
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Given the relative dearth of case law, the Ohio Supreme
Court's opinion in Ohio ex rel. Corn v. Russo' is potentially
quite important, since it is one of the relatively few appellate
court decisions to address the general question of document
retention outside the context of discovery abuse.9 Many
corporate executives, consultants, and especially expert
witnesses, will find much cause for alarm in this case, as it
appears to set an exceptionally high standard for maintaining
documents, even in the absence of an investigation or discovery
request. Moreover, the court evidently predicated its decision on
a single line of transcript-a flaw not unknown elsewhere in
appellate court review, but especially problematic in this
context.
The significance of the decision is somewhat obscured by
the arcana of Ohio appellate practice. The case involves a
contempt proceeding against an expert witness, but much of the
opinion is devoted to such technicalities as the difference
between a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus, the
distinction between civil and criminal contempt, and the trial
court's jurisdiction over witnesses following dismissal of the
underlying case. These questions are procedurally meaningful,
of course, but they do not have much extrinsic impact. The
ultimate issue in the case, however, could end up having
tremendous consequences for record keeping, by businesses and
expert witnesses, in Ohio and elsewhere.
In brief, these were the facts in Corn: Dr. Corn is an
orthopedic surgeon frequently retained as an expert witness by
defense counsel in personal injury cases. He testified for the
defense in this case, and in an attempt to establish his pro-
defense biases, the plaintiff's lawyers subpoenaed his tax and
office records, hoping that they would reveal Dr. Corn's receipt
of great amounts of money from insurance companies. Most
importantly, the plaintiffs wanted all of Dr. Corn's appointment
calendars for the previous eight years and all of his Independent
Medical Examination (IME) reports for the same period.'°
8. 740 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 2001).
9. More typically, the issue arises when documents are destroyed or concealed once
litigation has commenced. See e.g. Coates, 756 F.2d 524 (indicating that plant closing
resulted in extensive destruction of documents while class action was pending).
10. 740 N.E.2d at 267.
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Dr. Corn produced one appointment calendar and about one
hundred IME reports, claiming that the balance of the requested
material had been discarded according to his office policy."
Faced with this response, most courts would either accept the
witness's excuse" or, at most, bar his testimony for failure to
comply with a valid discovery request. 3 In this case, however,
the court went much further.
The trial judge held that Dr. Corn's failure to comply with
the subpoena could be deemed contempt of court, and ordered
him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Dr.
Corn then testified that he had routinely destroyed his old
appointment books and IME reports. On cross examination he
conceded that one of his reasons for discarding these materials
was to prevent plaintiffs' attorneys from using them to establish
bias. "4
Before the trial court could rule on the contempt citation,
Dr. Corn's attorneys sought relief in the Ohio Supreme Court,
claiming that the entire proceeding was improper. The Supreme
Court held that the proceeding was proper and returned it to the
trial court to complete the hearing. Implicit in the court's ruling
was the idea that Dr. Corn could indeed be punished for the
routine destruction of his records, even though the destruction
evidently occurred before the issuance, or even the notice, of
any subpoena. In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court made the
startling observation that it could constitute criminal contempt
for parties to "purposefully conduct[] their business[es] in such
a fashion as to circumvent civil discovery rules and orders of the
court attempting to enforce them." 5
11. Id.
12. See e.g. Coates, 756 F. 2d at 551 (imposing no sanction because plant employee
"was unaware at the time he destroyed the disciplinary letters that there was any pending
litigation regarding defendants' disciplinary policies, although [he] was aware that one
employee had filed a suit regarding his discharge").
13. See e.g. Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(recognizing that preclusion of testimony based on spoliated evidence is sometimes
appropriate, but holding that the intentional destruction of expert witness materials in this
case warranted an "adverse inference" jury instruction about the experts' work and
preclusion of their further participation in the case).
14. 740 N.E.2d at 267.
15. 740 N.E.2d at 269.
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There can be no doubt that it is contempt of court (or
worse) to destroy documents that have been subpoenaed or
requested in discovery. And, as Arthur Andersen learned, it can
constitute obstruction of justice to destroy records known to be
the subject of a pending investigation. On the other hand, most
businesses and governmental agencies, including physicians and
expert witnesses, follow retention policies that call for the
regular disposal of old documents on a defined schedule. Before
the decision in the Corn case, it would have been widely
believed that there was no general obligation to maintain old
appointment calendars and reports that were not the subject of
pending or impending proceedings. 6 Discarding old documents
was considered permissible, so long as it was not done for the
specific purpose of evading discovery. As I explained elsewhere
just a few years ago,
an expert should never destroy any items--document,
object, photograph, record-for the purpose of concealing
it from discovery or obstructing another party's access to
evidence. Of course, papers and objects may be discarded
in the ordinary course of "housekeeping," but any item that
has been requested in discovery must be preserved until the
request has been complied with by the expert or disallowed
by a court."
It appears that Dr. Corn made a practice of throwing away
his old calendars and reports. He agreed, on cross examination,
that one reason was to prevent their use by opposing counsel,
but he did not say that this was the only reason, or even the
primary reason. Most important, he does not seem to have
destroyed anything directly related to a matter in litigation, or to
have undertaken any destruction at a time when the material
destroyed was subject to a discovery request or subpoena.
In other words, Dr. Corn faced a contempt citation because
of his cagey practice of limiting the material he kept on hand,
and concomitantly limiting the material he might someday be
asked to supply in response to discovery. However one regards
16. Retention of certain documents may, however, be governed by statute or regulation.
See e.g 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (requiring employment records to be kept for at least one
year).
17. Steven Lubet, Expert Testimony: A Guide for Expert Witnesses and The Lawyers
Who Examine Them 183 (Natl. Inst. for Tr. Advoc. 1998).
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such a scheme-is it astute or conniving?-it was not previously
thought to be grounds for contempt.
Most disturbing was the Ohio court's manipulation of a
single snippet of Dr. Corn's testimony. According to the court's
paraphrase of the trial record, Dr. Corn "conceded that one of
the reasons he destroys these records is to prevent plaintiffs and
plaintiffs' attorneys from establishing his financial interest and
defense bias in personal injury litigation." 8 The absence of a
direct quote from the transcript is troubling, since it seems
exceptionally unlikely that Dr. Corn actually testified that he
was seeking to conceal an alleged "defense bias."
Anyone familiar with the techniques of cross examination
would recognize the inherent ambiguity of Dr. Corn's
concession. He testified on direct examination that he regularly
and routinely discarded old files that were no longer active.
Then on cross examination, he candidly agreed-no doubt in
response to a leading question-that the collateral benefits of his
policy included the subsequent unavailability of the materials for
possible impeachment in later, as yet unfiled, proceedings. The
Ohio Supreme Court opinion, however, gives us no way of
knowing the actual nature and scope of Dr. Corn's concession.
Did he simply acknowledge that he was aware that a plaintiff
might someday ask for his old reports? Did he actually use the
phrase "one of [my] reasons," or is that merely an
interpretation? Was he allowed to explain the relative
importance of that "reason" in developing his office policy?
Indeed, was there any redirect examination on the point,
expanding on Dr. Corn's full position?
The lack of specificity in the Ohio Supreme Court opinion
is troubling for two reasons. First, it seems likely that the court
exaggerated the degree of Dr. Corn's intent, seizing upon a
single line of testimony to the exclusion of the rest. But even
granting the broadest implications of Dr. Corn's statement, the
court nonetheless failed to explain the rationale for its ruling.
How could it be contempt for Dr. Corn to destroy
documents before he had notice that anyone was seeking them?
And what level of intent is necessary to base a contempt finding
on the conduct of one's business "in such a fashion as to
18. 740 N.E.2d at 267.
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circumvent civil discovery rules"? Do businesses have an
obligation to maintain their records in a way that facilitates
future discovery? May anyone involved in frequent litigation
ever throw away any documents? Or must every paper (and
probably every email message) be preserved indefinitely, at least
by those who are regularly in court-a group that would
presumably include not only expert witnesses, but also insurance
companies, taxicab operators, utilities, consumer lenders, public
housing authorities, and any number of other businesses and
governmental agencies?
Of course, the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling merely
remanded Dr. Corn for a hearing on the show-cause order, so it
might have seemed logical to wait for a final disposition before
addressing the many complex questions raised by the case. But
that was surely a mistake. The trial court's eventual ruling (if
any) is unlikely to be published or widely publicized; it may or
may not be appealed. 9 Thus, all we may have in the way of a
holding is the Ohio Supreme Court's rather chilling
pronouncement that a finding of criminal contempt can be based
on business practices that had among their perceived benefits
when adopted the advantage of avoiding hypothetical discovery
requests in hypothetical cases, even if they served valid business
purposes as well.
Perhaps that is the law in Ohio. If so, it would have been
better by far to develop it on a more complete record. If not, it
would have been better to say so with some clarity, because this
decision leaves lawyers and their clients with far too little
guidance. And if that is indeed the law in Ohio, and if it is likely
to become the law elsewhere, businesses, expert witnesses, and
professionals of all kinds will be well advised to review their
document-retention polices, to consider whether those policies
might expose them to Corn-style citations for contempt, and to
keep an eye on what the appellate courts do next.
19. As of this writing, the case is still pending and Dr. Corn's fate is as yet undecided.

